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GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1912.¹

IF we are inclined to see in the development of modern philosophy the steadily increasing prominence of the more distinctively metaphysical problems, we may find this movement especially in evidence in the works which have appeared during the last years. One might say, if one were seeking a unifying or synoptic expression for this tendency, especially in connection with a review of German philosophy, that the conflict which has been preparing of late years between pure theory of knowledge and metaphysics has broken out. Besides the enrichment that will come to thought from this conflict, there is also the advantage that the ultimate and fundamental principles upon which both sciences depend must in the course of the discussion come out ever more and more clearly. Pure theory of knowledge is the philosophical tendency which stretches the concept of knowledge so far as to include within it all questions about the *being* of things. Theories of knowledge may again be divided into two groups: the phenomenalist or positivistic, which in general recognizes nothing as real which is not content of thought; and the logistical theory of knowledge, which remains indifferent to the problem of being, on the supposition that philosophy is concerned only with absolute norms and values, and has nothing to do with absolute realities.

The logistical point of view has attained its genuine classical expression in the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, and has as its best known representatives Cohen, Natorp, Kinkel, and Cassirer. In an article in the *Kantstudien*, "Kant und die Marburger Schule" (Festheft zu Hermann Cohens 70. Geburtstag), Natorp brings together the essential tendencies of this movement so admirably and with such fine precision that we can use this study for purposes of general orientation. Kant's results are here regarded as less authoritative and significant than his method. The method, however, points back to Plato,

¹ Translated from the German MS. by Dr. E. Jordan.

since it was Plato who first understood that the procedure of thought does not consist in establishing a rigidly fixed system of ideas, but involves unceasing movement. And for Kant also thought is infinite movement. There is nothing that is not involved in this process of motion, there are no objects at rest, no things in themselves, which thought might, as it were, approach from without in order to imprint its form upon them. Such realism comes into contradiction with the principal motive of the transcendental method, the meaning of which is just this, that all objectivity is nothing more than a definite structure of thought. In its categorical conformableness to law (*Gesetzmässigkeit*), thought itself creates the fundamental logical and scientific notions of things, which, from the point of view of naive consciousness, are falsely conceived of as beyond all power of thought. There can be nothing absolutely foreign to thought. Such a conception is precluded by the 'Copernican' revolution of view accomplished by Kant, according to which being finds in thought its ultimate explanation. But the categories must not be regarded as fixed schemes and forms of the mind—an error from which Kant was not quite free. They must not be conceived as proceeding from an immovable point, but rather as constituted by the reciprocal functional relationships and determining conditions; they must be resolved again into the living thought process itself which created them. This method of correlation, instead of that of strict deduction, has been developed in an independent way by Natorp in his *Logischen Grundlagen*, in which he also shows the connection of this method with Cohen's *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*. The dependence of this view upon the Hegelian dialectic, as well as its difference from it, is unmistakable. The difference does not consist merely, as Natorp thinks, in the absolutist tendency of Hegel, in his claim to have exhausted the totality of thought, but more particularly in the fact that the panlogism of the philosophy of identity is metaphysics, while neo-Kantian panlogism, even in its most extreme development, remains logic. The absolute mind is for Hegel not merely the definition of being, but rather the *creation* of being through the activity of thought. Logical

thought becomes a world-creating power since it not merely circumscribes the forms of things, but penetrates into their innermost nature. It must not limit itself to a sensuous *significance*; it must represent a creative *act*, a dynamic mode of reality. Neo-Kantianism denies the possibility of transcending consciousness and reaching the thing in itself, on the ground that subject and object and the relation between them which is exhibited in an act of knowledge are not immediate reality, but merely an expression of a *logical* act and similar in character to the limiting concept of a 'thing in itself' which is postulated as lying beyond the correlation of subject and object. In whatever direction we may proceed in our reflection, we find ourselves in the presence of something already logically formed. Even the simple, seemingly indivisible act of perception is shown on closer analysis to involve logical determination. Thus neo-Kantianism attempts even to bring about a transformation of the notion of being into a category of pure logic. This is the boldest and most original theory of the school. Being is resolved into value, reality into an ideal worth, and existence into pure essence. Outside the school Rickert also has developed this point of view in connection with his doctrine of judgment.

Quite recently there appears to be a reaction against this extreme logism (*Logismus*), of which mention was made in last year's report. One foundation pillar of the Kantian system in particular is shaken by this way of thinking. The Kantian system rests upon the strict dualism of rational understanding and irrational reality. In this view being is characterized by the very fact that it is always incapable of being caught in the net of logical values. It is alogical; just as, on the other hand, the characteristic mark of the logical is independence of any particular mode of existence. This distinction is clearly shown in the fundamental difference which Kant makes between mathematical and dynamical categories, is still more evident in the arguments by which he overthrew the old dogmatic ontology, which had found its basis in the notion of God. This victory was possible only because Kant clearly recognized the peculiar function and mode of *existence*. But it is the purpose of modern

logism to subordinate existence to thought, whether this subordination is regarded as a completed fact or as an infinite process. Accordingly it is concerned to rationalize fully the thing-in-itself, to spiritualize it into an idea,—indeed, into a fundamental function of the rational intellect. Kant, on the other hand, quite obviously regards the thing-in-itself as a factor foreign to thought, to which sensation points as its ground of being. The fact that something exists, remains for the critical philosopher an absolute limit which logical thought cannot pass beyond. Even the identity philosophers were not able to transcend this limit by resolving being into logical validity. On the contrary,—as is exemplified in the case of Hegel—they were able to overcome the difficulty only by seeking a form of existence which would at the same time be of a logical nature, in other words, by making the transition from logic to metaphysics. There is always presupposed, therefore, a substratum, a final ground of reality, however undifferentiated in character, in relation to which alone thought can exercise its functions, but which it can never produce out of itself.

These necessary limitations of logism have been excellently set forth by Lask in his *Logik der Philosophie*. Logical experience bestows upon its material conceptual definiteness, but it does not penetrate into it in such a way as to transform it into a stuff of conceptual character. There is, in addition, another consideration which appears conditioned by the very procedure of logical idealism. While the extra-logical material is being mastered conceptually, a reference to a creator or supporter of conceptual functions is already involved in this process. Can one then really accept a view of thought which regards it as cut off from every thinking consciousness, and, left dependent only upon itself, as floating in mid-air in unbalanced suspense? Worth, as the sphere of validity in the world of thought, may have an autonomous reality,—a reality independent of every consciousness. But in thought values the factual character of thought is not exhausted: thinking is always found connected with a thinking being. And so it appears that the organic unity of subject and object, which the logicist tries to make dependent on thought,

is in reality already presupposed by thought. This is indeed the real sense of the Cartesian principle which forms the point of departure for modern philosophy. Even where the value of thought and its results are still under dispute, the reality of thought, and with it of the thinking Ego, seems assured. The logicist will escape this consequence by regarding pure thinking as a completely impersonal process which does not presuppose the empirical subject, but only creates it continuously. But in that case a superpersonal, metaphysical consciousness must be required as a bearer of thought. And really many logicists recognize the fact that they are driven to this consequence, to which, to be sure, they give a very unsafe and ambiguous expression in the notion of 'consciousness in general.' I have already shown in earlier articles that only a real consciousness can serve as the bearer of a real process of thought, and that this implies in our case therefore a real All-consciousness like the Hegelian World-Spirit. Doubtless this position is influenced to a much greater extent by metaphysical considerations than are the theories which refer thought merely to an empirical Ego.

Our result accordingly is that all thought presupposes a reality of which we are immediately aware, whether by way of perception, will, or intuition. These consequences agree in many of their connections with the arguments which Frischeisen-Köhler has raised against the logistical standpoint in his essay *Das Realitätsproblem* (published by the Kantgesellschaft, Reuther und Reichard, Berlin, pp. 98). He opposes the theory that reality is a logical category, by appealing to the independent relation, first of sensation, and then of will, to objective existence. The notion of an external world is not gained through the operation of intelligence, but through a voluntaristic activity. When we meet with an obstacle in our active willing experience, we become immediately aware of a foreign existence. The consciousness of the object is consequently transferred into a pre-logical sphere. This appeal to the will is the continuation of a motive which was strongly advocated mainly by Dilthey, but which really goes back to Maine de Biran. It has an unmistakable similarity to modern intuitionism. In the hands of Frischei-

sen-Köhler, it is true, the principle of immediate knowledge leads only to an empirical, and not to an absolute realism. The reality of objects is independent of sensory and thinking consciousness; but it is not independent of all determination by consciousness. It is indeed already presupposed in the notion of will and practice that the experienced obstacle to the will is only present as a correlate of an Ego which forms its organic complement. On the other hand, absolute realism is dogmatic in so far as it carries the characteristics gained within the consciousness over into the sphere of the completely transcendent. The author has developed this point of view more completely in the essay *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit* (Verlag Teubner, Leipzig).

Oswald Külpe's work *Die Realisierung*, the first volume of which has appeared, is an attempt to justify and establish on an extensive scale the foundations of realism. The title of the work at once expresses its tendency: it attempts the task of pointing out the necessary relations of knowledge to an independent self-contained reality. Külpe's formulation includes the widest aspects of the subject. Not only in the natural sciences, in the notion of the external world, but also in psychology and in the mental sciences generally we are confronted by the necessity of positing such a relation. In both fields thought transcends itself, and acquires its meaning and guidance only by the acceptance of a reality which cannot be resolved into thought. Previous attempts to get beyond Idealism, for example Kraft's essay *Erkenntnisbegriff und Weltbegriff*, which was mentioned in last year's report, have formulated the problem only with reference to the problem of the external world. In Külpe's book, on the contrary, the whole realm of being is involved in the formulation of the problem. Thus it is possible to gain the broadest possible basis of defense in securing the realistic argument against outside attacks. It must be recognized as Külpe's special merit to have clearly discriminated, perhaps for the first time, between two different kinds of idealism, namely, the idealism of consciousness, and transcendental or logical idealism. Up to this time these two methods, which indeed have definite

points of connection, have not been carefully distinguished. And yet the analysis of Neo-Kantianism has shown us that at least the form of expression of logical idealism and that of the idealism of consciousness are radically different. The idealism of consciousness, which in every case points back to Hume or particularly to Berkeley, is a philosophy of being. It merely simplifies and unifies the particulars of existence, while it in every case refers the existent to a spiritual being as its ground. It takes a *definite* form of reality, namely the spiritual form, and postulates it the ground of the whole of reality. On the other hand, logical idealism is a philosophy of value: it resolves the real into an ideal, existence into an essence, the existent thing into a thing of *worth*. Külpe's arguments against the idealism of consciousness show a realistic trend of thought. In the process of building up reality through our thinking, we are continuously transcending the immediate flowing content of consciousness. Yet we do not transcend the immediacy of consciousness in order merely to transport ourselves to the realm of ideal logical norms and values, but rather in order to create or constitute a metaphysical reality. At this point the emphasis falls upon the fundamental difference which Külpe maintains between the method of mathematics and that of the concrete sciences (*Realwissenschaften*). In mathematics thought creates continuously its own objects without regard to whether or not these objects belong to any reality at all. In the concrete sciences, on the contrary, thought is bound up with objects which, by virtue of their own nature, prescribe to thought its direction. The idealistic objection that even in this case objects are not something given ready-made, is justified in so far that thought is never a mere process of mirroring, but is rather a process of constructing and defining. The process of construction and determination, however, is in this case not free, or dominated by merely ideal laws, but is dominated by the actual character of the material. In the same way as Frischeisen-Köhler, Külpe refers to the "empirical determination" of thought as shown in the concrete sciences. And if it is true also that we nowhere in this field attain to mere matter as an absolute limit of the logical, it is on the other

hand just as true that we never have, as in mathematics, a pure logical construction without any taint of material relationship. The categories or postulates of thought are not only always represented in connection with some alogical material; they appear also to be progressively defined through that same material. Külpe is here just as much concerned to point out the errors of naïve realism as to combat the extreme form of absolute logism: critical realism must occupy a mean position between the two. Knowledge consists neither in mirroring nor in creating; it is a comprehension of realities which are not given, but which are made manifest through what is given. The transcendental method as it was established by Kant did not deny the real existence of things, but rather imposed aprioristic ideal conditions upon their comprehension and elaboration.

Pure logicism, against which these writings are directed, properly has its beginnings in the work of Solomon Maimon, whose *Versuch einer neuen Logik*, one of the most interesting reprints of rare philosophical works issued by the Kantgesellschaft, exhibits this tendency. We are indebted to Kuntze for a detailed monograph on Maimon's philosophy, *Die Philosophie Solomon Maimons* (Heidelberg, Verlag Winter, pp. xxv, 531).

The first volume of the *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Tübingen, Verlag von Mohr), edited by Ruge, and with the coöperation of Windelband, contains an encyclopedic statement of the problem. In the introduction the editor announces the purpose of the undertaking to be the systematic unity of knowledge with the strictest possible avoidance of personal one-sidedness. In the interest of the latter purpose, different thinkers, —Windelband, Royce, Couturat, Croce, Enriques, and Loskij,— as representatives of different nations and tendencies, are given space to express themselves. We may in this connection emphasize Windelband's statement of the distinction between formal logic and methodology. The highest laws of thought of formal logic are not merely norms for a knowing consciousness; for this point of view only shows their application to the psychological plane, which must not be confused with their *autonomic* significance. Validity in itself and validity for us must be dis-

tinguished from each other. This separation of value from norm is a recognized distinction of modern theory of knowledge, and is also to be met with in Rickert, Lask, and Meinong. The author goes back to his earlier writings in his differentiation of constitutive and reflective categories and of the idiographic and the nomothetic methods. His determination of the relation between thought and being is interesting and suggestive of Bergson's intuitionism. In his view, knowledge is a selection out of a totality which is accordingly related to knowledge, not as a thing to its appearance, but as whole to part.

The essence of pure logicism, which Natorp has set forth in so concise and striking a way, appears not only in the treatment of questions of logic and theory of knowledge, but also in other fields of philosophical reflection. The advantages and defects of this method are equally clear in ethics and æsthetics. As a proof of this one may cite Cohen's *System der Philosophie*, the third part of which, entitled *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls* (Berlin, Cassirer, Band I, xxv + 401, Band II, xv + 477), has appeared. The first requirement to be put forth by the author is that of complete systematic character. To discuss the system of philosophy in one of its three parts, logic, ethics, and æsthetics means to make it as a whole appear quite illusory. The concept of 'purity' (*Reinheit*), which Cohen ascribes to the organic process of creation which is active in knowledge, will, and feeling, is taken in the sense of strict transcendentalism. This, when analyzed into its elements, perhaps means essentially this: that philosophical thought in logic, ethics, and æsthetics must create and develop its concepts independently, without any reference to a definite content of being, whether the latter is empirical or metaphysical. This indeed is the essential significance of this tendency of thought, as the article by Natorp sets forth: pure thought cannot seek in a reality outside of itself for the justification of its fundamental postulates, since there is no such external reality, and since, whatever has a valid claim to reality, depends upon the mediating activity of thought. Here there are two motives distinguished that are not separated in Cohen's statement: the motive of system-formation and that of logicism.

Every metaphysics of art is rejected as a romantic reaction against systematic philosophy. Even if one should grant the necessity of system in the interest of unity of culture; even if one recognize, as is just, the special merit of Cohen and his school in the forceful and emphatic statement with which they have represented the interrelations of the different cultural interests; even if one goes so far as to reject all separations and divisions of thinking, which constitute a danger of the modern mind; yet it seems to me that Cohen's notion of system is conceived in an arbitrary way. It is difficult to understand why a metaphysical conception of the world should be excluded by the notion of system. Indeed, logic, ethics, and aesthetics could take part in a world conception that would be proportionate to their different functions. Anyway, from the point of view of strict interest in system a coördination of these three disciplines is not necessarily demanded; there might very well be united with co-ordination a relation of superordination and of subordination. And the degrading of religion, in which the relation to metaphysics shows itself most clearly, to a special province of feeling, betrays still more clearly the tendencies of the point of departure and of the whole view which is presupposed in the formulation of the problem.

Of course, it is still true that the extraordinary merit of this work, which consists in delicacy of conceptual construction and in dialectical elasticity of thought, can with just as little right be denied as the merit of Cohen's earlier writings.

Broder Christiansen shows another direction of interest in his *Philosophie der Kunst* (Verlag von Claus und Feddersen, Hanau). His formulation of the problems—in many respects not unlike that of Guyau—remains much closer to reality, especially to the reality of life. Art is self-revelation of the absolute and the metaphysical in man. In the same author's *Kritik der Kantischen Erkenntnislehre* (Verlag von Behr, Berlin, pp. 177) one also perceives an attempt to overcome the narrowness of pure logism. This book seems to me really more valuable in its critical analyses than in its positive results. The author shows—in this important point in agreement with Leonard Nelson—that the problem of

experience is not given its proper expression by Kant and the Kantians. One cannot deduce the problem of experience from scientific thought, for the latter must itself first get critical justification. And with no better right may one refer it to the transcendental-psychological organization of the subject, since thereby the *quæstio juris* would be degraded to a *quæstio facti*, and this is indeed contrary to the true spirit of transcendentalism. The problem of experience must be formulated as a critical problem of value. The categories have to be derived from the definition of reality; but how this derivation is in detail to be accomplished the author leaves indefinite. Christiansen also believes with other modern epistemologists that the guide for the formation of the concept of reality is to be found in an 'ought,' and he defines this 'ought' more concretely than do Rickert and his pupils.

Although Christiansen represents pure transcendentalism, he admits the possibility of a metaphysical reality and of metaphysical knowledge. But this metaphysical knowledge must also be empirical in character; it cannot be represented in either analytical or synthetical judgments *a priori*. This proposal to base metaphysics upon experience seems to constitute a position which has some relation at least to intuitionism.

Christiansen's book *Vom Selbstbewusstsein* (Verlag Friedrich Feddersen, Berlin, pp. 87) may be considered as a completion of his earlier work. By means of an acute process of analysis, the author tries to reach in the course of the discussion the surprising result that there is no immediate knowledge of the spiritual, and no immediacy of self-consciousness; and that not perception, but rather reflection is the instrument through which the self is known. The depths of the soul life remain unknown. The author seeks a proof of this proposition in the fact that psychology, in spite of efforts of more than two thousand years, is not able to point out the elementary processes of the internal world in a way that is free from contradiction.

Walter Schmied-Kowarzik arrives at an essentially different conclusion in regard to psychological knowledge in his *Umriss einer neuen analytischen Psychologie* (Leipzig, Ambrosius Barth,

pp. vi, 318). He proposes to strip away from psychology all apodictic kinds of knowledge, which are, in principle, of the same order as the logical or mathematical. The interpretation which is here given to the problem is doubtless an original one. The notion of analysis is conceived in a new sense, a sense essentially different from the Kantian. It is no longer contrasted with the notion of synthesis, but rather with that of the establishment of empirical matter of fact. The author is right in that he sets aside the fundamental opposition between analysis and synthesis, since in both we are dealing rather with different directions of one and the same relation of content. One might say that analysis is synthesis as seen from the opposite direction; it is the resolution of any given complex into its elements, together with insight into the internal relations of the elements. Since for such insight the existence of the complex is a matter of indifference, the distinguishing character proper to the complex is that it may or may not possess existence. Thus through the analysis of mathematical space we gain geometrical principles whose absolute value is not dependent upon the existence of the images upon which they are based. Similarly, we can, according to the view of the author, attain to apodictic knowledge through the use of the principle of analysis in psychology, and can thus satisfy or fulfil Dilthey's claim for a descriptive and analytical psychology based upon a strict systematic conception of the spiritual life.

Convincing as these deductions are in many respects, it seems to me that they do not adequately take account of the peculiar character of analyzed complexes. For it is impossible to doubt that there is a fundamental difference between a complex which, like the mathematical-mechanical itself, is formed out of ideal, non-existential elements, and a complex which, like the psychological, consists of empirical elements. The analysis of the latter produces at most *similarity* and *difference*, without being able to estimate in any absolute way the significance of these relations. From this consideration we can explain the mechanistic reduction of qualities to quantities in the philosophy of nature. And to this we must add that the spiritual life, which is emphasized by the

author himself, is a continuous, unitary process whose elements are fluctuating and on that account can only be distinguished with more difficulty than can those of the outer world.

Although metaphysics is at present beginning quite energetically to claim attention in German philosophy, one thing doubtless makes it appear at a disadvantage as compared with pure theory of knowledge. It is that theory of knowledge represents a completed whole or system of strivings all of which take essentially the same direction, while metaphysical interests have not yet found such a common focus. The latter at the present time run out in indefinite lines whose goal can rather be guessed at than clearly indicated. Scientific realism, for the most effective statement of which we are indebted to Külpe, will hardly fulfil the great task of philosophy, which may be stated as the creation of a unitary world-view. This theory does not sufficiently resolve the abstract fundamental notions of science into ultimate elements of immediate being. So far as broadly sketched attempts in this direction have up to this time been undertaken, they seem to result in a *philosophy of life* instead of in the old world-views which group themselves about the central idea of spirit or will. While Bergson's *Creative Evolution* has pointed out the way for this new conception, German literature has also not been lacking in works which have had in view a similar generalization in terms of the idea of life. Hermann Keyserling had such an undertaking already in mind in his *Prolegomena zur Naturphilosophie*, and Karl Joel, in his *Seele und Welt* (Eugen Diederichs, Jena, pp. vii, 424), has given a much firmer basis to this thought. His work, which is perhaps less attractive in form than in content, hopes to overcome the onesidedness of materialism and idealism by recognizing the duality of the spiritual and corporeal, while yet developing both of these from a higher unity, or point of indifference. The influence of Schelling is clearly traceable here, as is also the relation to Bergson. Not without reason, then, does Joel call his work a search for an organic conception. For him also matter is congealed life. One and the same original principle develops within material and psychical being. At one point it falls apart into an unrelated

state of manifoldness, at another it gathers itself together in a unity of the highest order.

It is of the greatest significance for the philosophy of life that investigations regarding its foundation should be carried on from a strictly scientific point of view. One of the most distinguished biologists of our time, Hans Driesch, has the merit of having attempted to make the transition from empirical science to metaphysics. In his broadly outlined *Philosophie des Organischen*, Driesch has already attempted a revivification of vitalism, interpreting the term in a thoroughly critical, non-fantastical sense. And from the empirical as well as from the logical point of view the result of his careful investigations is the autonomy of life, its irresolvability into mechanical processes. He avoids any confusion of the problem of life with conceptions derived from an obscure panpsychism. The interrelations of the corporeal and the spiritual life, which conception is most important of all for metaphysical world-interpretation, is not to be construed by means of vague analogies, but rather by means of a system of closely related concepts. Driesch's new work *Ordnungslehre* (Diederichs, Jena, pp. 355) is intended to fulfil this purpose, and represents a system of the non-metaphysical aspects of philosophy. The *Ordnungslehre* is merely the preparation for a real philosophy of knowledge, *i. e.*, for metaphysics. Without yet raising the question of reality, it has to make an inventory of the mind with reference to its immanent relations, and then proceed to exhibit the inner structure of these relations. The author passes from the original postulates of being, existence, being-thus, being-otherwise, and their particularizations, to the Order of the reality of nature and of the sphere of the Ego, in order finally to open up vistas leading to theory of knowledge and metaphysics.

This plan of a doctrine of Order might be designated as an impressionism of thought. Not that thought would by it be resolved into impressions. This flatly contradicts the strict logical tendency of the author. But thought is estimated not at all in relation to its realistic import, but merely in its logical—not in its psychological—form of appearance. Rational Orders are regarded as development in a way that is consistent with the

most extreme presuppositions of solipsism. Definite concepts come forward with the demand for realization; they are directed toward something real as if something real corresponded to them, so that this 'as if' is to be conceived as a symbol, and not, as with Vaihinger, as a fiction. This method of procedure is extended to psychology also. The processes of realization have in psychology as well as in the outer world first of all to appear merely as types of Order. In this view memory is defined as a conscious 'having' of anything whatever that possesses the mark of past significance.

The doctrine of Order corresponds to what has elsewhere been designated as pure theory of knowledge—though certainly this is not Driesch's terminology. Or it is equivalent to what has been called non-existential consideration of categories, which also forms the purpose of Meinong's theoretical investigations of objects. That such a point of view is possible, and even necessary, cannot be doubted. But at least the world is conceived from this point of view as a rigid product of abstraction, a sum of blind symbols, meanings, and schema, which are lacking in any sensuous content. It is just this extreme logicism which completely divorces thought from reality,—which shows in its final consequences that where there is no conviction or assurance of reality, worth also must disappear. Driesch accordingly regards his undertaking as a mere preliminary step to metaphysics. Only the completion of a metaphysics from this point of view would make possible for us an adequate judgment of the significance of the work as a whole. For he has doubtless undertaken a task upon which the further development of philosophy depends, namely, the unification of the doctrine of correct thinking with that of valid knowledge and that of real being. For a philosophy of life, as for every metaphysics in general, it is first of all necessary to deal with problems of logic and theory of knowledge. The oneness of Bergson's doctrine lies mainly in the fact that it puts intuition into a too sharp and irreconcilable opposition with the principle of rationality. In this way the Logos is displaced by the Mythos, while the philosophy of the future will have to look for a synthesis of both.

The effort to obtain such a synthesis is evident in Georg Simmel's latest writings. It was indeed apparent in his *Philosophische Kultur* and especially in his *Goethe-Buch*. The *Philosophische Kultur* (Leipzig, Verlag von Klinkhardt, pp. 319) contains a collection of essays, which, widely as they differ from one another in subject, are at the same time bound together by two different movements which indeed on closer view are seen to be connected, namely, the method, and the invisible, ideal purpose. The method is thus characterized by Simmel himself in the Introduction to the work: "Since philosophical opinions remain quite irreconcilable with each other and possess no undisputed validity; since nevertheless a common element may be traced through all of them, whose value survives all the controversies of particular thinkers and carries further and further the philosophical process, it follows that this common element cannot lie in any content whatever, but must rather be looked for in the process itself." The invisible guiding motive is the idea of multiform richness of life. And while the thought process seeks to adapt itself to life, and to adapt to itself the plasticity of life's materials, it becomes itself the life process. And thus it is characteristic also of Simmel that for him form and content, method and object, all ultimately come together into unity. The book contains studies of a psychological, æsthetic, cultural-philosophical, and religio-philosophical nature. The gradual becoming of that which we discover as the ultimate unity of the different life functions, is to be here raised from the form of subjective impression to that of the objective notion. And indeed Simmel here regards life as tragic in character. In its fundamental nature, life is directed toward an absolute; and yet it remains enclosed in the relativity of relations and oppositions. In the first essay, which gives an analysis of adventure, the tragic conflict of relative and absolute already appears. Still more intensively this same conflict dominates his treatment of the problem of sex. The differentiation of being into male and female is the expression of the inborn necessity of all living being, under which each can attain self realization and an understanding of itself only by relation to another.

But the human spirit is not content to remain imprisoned within the bounds of this relativity. And so there arises this strange result, that the man sets up norms and standards of value, which although specifically masculine in their origin and content, still lay claim to absolute validity for the woman also. The problem of culture also reveals tragic elements, while the concept of tragedy is likewise carried over by Simmel into æsthetic and religious problems. In this connection I call attention particularly to the essay on Michelangelo, where the tragic element is represented in terms which involve both art and religion.

The relation of the *Goethe* (Verlag von Klinkhardt und Biermann, Leipzig, 4 pp., vii+264) to the metaphysics of life is still closer. Simmel has in mind no mere literary-historical purpose, but conceives of Goethe as a representative of a definite, universal life-interest, and seeks to discover the spiritual sense of Goethe's conception of existence as such. The most important of these attempts is an investigation of Goethe's conception of truth. This he defines in terms of the worth which a conception attains, not according to the content to which it gives objective expression, but as a function, an element of life within the totality of life. Therein lies also the ground of the difference between this point of view and pragmatism. For pragmatism it is the content of a conception, its serviceableness, which gives to the conception its truth-value; "for Goethe it is the process of conceiving, the living function which conception calls into play in connection with spiritual development." Such a view is of course possible only within a view of the world as a whole, for which the knowledge of the individual appears as a part of the world-life, for which consequently the subject is regarded as a part of absolute being. This is the great opposition between the universalism of Goethe and the dualism of Kant, for whom the transition from being to Knowledge signifies a fundamental *variation*. It is, regarded in its ultimate aspects, again the opposition of the mythical and the logical which we always find where intuition and intellect come into conflict with one another. The interpenetration and unification of the two we

have already shown to be the task of the future. If we can succeed in unifying the synthesis of Goethe which the analysis of Kant, then the way will be made clear not only for a new and great world-conception, but also for a new spiritual culture generally.

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